What we need to study now is not so much the hitherto neglected groups, but to concentrate on the way various groups interacted witti one another. This article focuses on the pangreh praja and its relationships with other groups. Studying the pangreh praja is important for a range of reasons. One is that they were by far the most important agents of the occupation authorities. The Japanese obliged the pangreh praja to implement most of the occupation policies. Another reason is that the pangreh praja worked very closely with most other groupings in Java such as the Japanese, the peasantry, the nationalists, the Chinese, and the Islamic leaders. Studying the pangreh praja would therefore provide a viewpoint which enables US to see the process of change in social relations in Java under the Japanese occupation.
The pangreh praja and social change
There is a widely held view that the pangreh praja acted as Japanese tools. The Japanese tried to utilize the nationalists and the Islamic leaders in their pursuit of ideological support, and the pangreh praja for exploiting the peasantry. The nationalists and the Muslims grasped opportunities and promoted their own causes, whereas the pangreh praja had no cause to promote. They were merely public servants whose work was to execute the government's policies unquestioningly. They are cast in the light of unprincipled bureaucrats who showed little hesitation in subjecting their people to the extreme forms of exploitation ordered by the foreign overlords. Some researchers have also pointed out that not a few pangreh praja capitalized on the situation and accumulated wealth for themselves, thus aggravating the consequences of the Japanese oppression.4
Recent studies, particularly with regard to forced rice delivery, have shown that the food shortages in Java were created not so much by Japanese exploitation but rather by the Japanese mishandling of the economy of Java (Sato 1994; Van der Eng 1994) . These studies have demonstrated that there was no real need for the Japanese to exploit huge slices of Java's resources, that the Japanese were incompetent as rulers, and that their incompetente created widespread social and econornic disarray in Java. The pangreh praja were drawn into this confused administration. This change of direction in our understanding wil1 lead to a revision of the role of the pangreh praja. The following section outlines how Japanese management of food distribution failed and created confusion. On the basis of this foundation the remaining sections examine how the pangreh praja became entangled in this maladministration and how this entanglement affected the welfare of the people as wel1 as social relations in Java. Previously the main focus of studies lay on the way the ideologies and politics which gained ground during the occupation led to the physical An outstanding exarnple is Lucas 1991.
(OL 'd '0861 'Z 'PA '9e61-0e61 ?~PuI-sPu~lJJPaN 'UeeMZ ' I' ) sailipdi3uud ~rayljo o x se (~q%u) uielv-aoxed pue (!la[) e~e4auaoy8uem atp jo uorie~[eisu~ and national revolutions from 1945 to 1949. In contrast, this article examines how politics altered the economy and social relations in the countryside. The episode of the peasant riots in Indramayu wil1 be examined in some detail. Although riots were infrequent, those in Indramayu should not be considered exceptional. Similar situations were created in many places throughout Java. The riots in Pekalongan Residency broke out after the Japanese surrender, but already by mid-1944, in the city of Cirebon rumours were spreading that the people of Pekalongan would rebel at the drop of a hat.5 The case of Indramayu wil1 illustrate how the maladroitness of the Japanese economic administration oppressed the peasantry in Java.
Failure of the Japanese attempt to control food distribution in Java
The Japanese policy in Java with regard to rice needs to be examined in two phases: before and after November 1943. In the first phase the primary purpose of the Japanese policy was to rehabilitate the economy of Java, which had been disrupted during the invasion. In the second phase, the Japanese decided to intensify defence build-ups, which involved the largescale mobilization of indigenous labourers, called romusha in Japanese. At the Same time they pressed farmers to deliver rice to the government in order to secure a food supply for the romusha. The notorious forced delivery of rice and romusha mobilization were therefore closely connected. hen the Japanese took over the government of the ~etherlands East Indies in March 1942 they had no particular policies about foodstuffs in Java. There was no need for them to exploit much of Java's rice. The Japanese population in Java fluctuated at around fifty thousand, which was 0.1 % of that of the whole island. They could therefore easily secure sufficient food for themselves without becoming too much of a burden on Javanese society.6They had no plan to ship Javanese rice to Japan. They did send certain amounts of this rice to Sumatra, Kupang (Timor) and some other areas, but extant data, although incomplete, indicate that the quantities were most probably less than the amount Java had exported in the immediate pre-war years.
Circumstances dictated otherwise and the Japanese discovered that rice distribution in Java was in urgent need of their attention. Victims of the Dutch scorched-earth strategy and looting by Indonesians, many rice transportation and milling facilities had been destroyed. Finance for the mills had also temporarily stopped. The time was inopportune, as March Hereafter cited as Prawoto Report. "he Japanese Army in Central Java, for instance, could secure rice for themselves simply by requesting a couple of mills to process rice for them. See Rijstpellerijen 1946. was a pre-harvest period when stocks of rice usually ran short. To make the situation worse, some rice traders refrained from selling in anticipation of a rise in prices. Supplies of foodstuffs in big cities such as Jakarta and Bandung therefore ran critically low. Complaints and petitions about the difficulty of buying rice were frequently made to the Japanese who, by dint of military power, had made themselves the politica1 and administrative authorities.
Although large-scale harvesting commenced in April, harvested paddy often lay unsold due to the destruction of transportation and milling facilities, the standstill in government financing for the millers, and Chinese rice dealers' reluctance to buy paddy for fear of further looting. Purchase prices of paddy in the villages fel1 in consequence. Rehabilitation of the economy of Java was, therefore, one of the first important tasks of the Japanese military administration in Java. ' After taking some emergency measures to overcome the situation, in August the military administration created the Foodstuffs Management Office in Jakarta as the central body to coordinate food distribution in Java. This office drew up a more systematic plan for the 1943 fiscal year (April 1943 -March 1944 . Because their purpose was primarily to achieve a rehabilitation of the pre-war system, they modelled their plan on the system the Dutch had created after 1939, the year the war broke out in Europe. The Dutch, anticipating the imminence of war in the Indies, began establishing governmental control. over rice mills. The purpose was twofold: one was to secure a stable distribution of rice throughout the period of war by preventing economic confusion such as wartime inflation and war-profiteering; the other was to enable the army or the government to alter the pattern of rice distribution if necessary under emergency circumstances. In Java there were about 550 rice mills which, in 1940, processed 21% of the estimated total paddy production in Java. Out of the federations of rice mills the Dutch authorities had created the Rijst Verkoop Centrale (Rice Sales Centre) in each of the three provinces, which they funded through the Voedingsmiddelenfonds (Foodstuffs Fund). They obliged the mills to sell processed rice exclusively to the Rice Sales Centre, which in turn sold it to wholesalers at fixed prices. Nearly 80% of the rice in Java was pounded manually and marketed locally by private traders or consumed by the producers.8 The Japanese Foodstuffs Management Office took over the work which the Foodstuffs Fund had carried out. Using the Dutch records, this office set monthly and annual purchase targets and allocated purchase quotas to each residency. Operation of this system was set in motion simultaneously throughout Java in April 1943. Although based on the Dutch scheme, it malfunctioned from the outset. One reason was price inflation. The Japanese set the official prices of rice at the Same level as these had been in January 1942 but, by the time they began implementing this system, the black market prices had generally risen higher than the official ones. The government obliged the farmers to sell set quantities of rice to the mills and the mills to the government, but the farmers, rice brokers and millers often tried to circumvent government control and sold their rice through nongovernmental channels. Consequently the amount the government could procure always fel1 far below the target. The original procurement target for the 1943 fiscal year was 1,995,000 tonnes in stalk paddy, which was marginally over 20% of the estimated total production. The amount delivered to the government by the end of November 1943, wel1 after the main harvesting season, was no more than 1,257,000 tonnes, which was 63% of the target. Clearly the bulk of rice in Java was being distributed through non-governmental channels, which came to be called the 'black market'.
Although the governmental rice distribution system did not work satisfactorily and created some confusion in the marketing system, the changes in the first half of the occupation were, generally speaking, moderate, and no widespread radical fluctuations in the standard of living were observed. The drastic change in November 1943 took place as a result of the Japanese response to the war situation, which had clearly turned against Japan in the earlier months of the year. In March the Japanese had been compelled to retreat from Guadalcanal; in April Admiral Yamamoto's plane was shot down; and on 30 May Attu Island in the Aleutians was reoccupied by the Americans. The following day, 31 May, the Imperia1 Conference in Tokyo discussed the politica1 strategies that this new situation required. The decision was made to carry out massive defence build-ups throughout the theatre of war and at the Same time to try to enlist stronger cooperation from the nations of Southeast Asia by granting them broader politica1 concessions.
In Java the occupation authorities launched a number of measures between August and November 1943. Politica1 concessions included the large-scale promotion of Indonesian administrators, the establishment of centra1 and local advisory councils, andthe creation of the indigenous selfdefence forces. In the field of defence build-ups the key resource was labour, which was deemed to be abundant in Java. From the outset of the occupation the Japanese needed workers for a range of projects, such as repairing bridges and other destroyed facilities, and for starting coal mining operations to fill the gap created by the halt in coal imports. The total number of workers needed for these projects was still smal1 compared with the total population of Java. Until late 1943 or early 1944, lack of employment opportunities was a serious problem for the Javanese peasantry. To alleviate unemployment, the occupation authorities recommenced the transmigration of Javanese villagers to South Sumatra and also started a number of construction works. Although the Japanese conducted 'total mobilization' campaigns in one form or another throughout the occupation, these were little more than slogans until November 1943, after which they were transformed int0 real mass mobilizations (Sato 1994:60-80,154-200) .
The Japanese used the Chuo Sangiin (Centra1 Advisory Council) to intensify their resource mobilization campaigns. The first session was held from 15 to 19 October. The Japanese prearranged this session in such a way that the Indonesian representatives were forced to propose the creation of offices specifically for recruiting labourers throughout Java. The spadework of these offices was completed within a few months and systematic labour mobilization commenced from early 1944. In the second half of the occupation the Japanese constantly employed a few million people for a diverse range of purposes, summed up in the catchphrase, 'defence and production increase'.'
How the delivery of rice to the government could be improved was another topic of discussion during the first session of the Centra1 Advisory Council. Soon after this session, on 4 November, the Japanese authorities in Jakarta convened a meeting of heads of economy departments of each residency and requested that they make the utmost effort to fulfil the rice delivery quota set by the Foodstuffs Management Office. There were two main reasons for this request. One was that they had to secure foodstuffs for romusha. The other was that November to March was an off-crop season. Since rice procurement by the government had been very unsatisfactory until then, the Japanese could foresee that there would be serious shortages of rice in the government-run shops in cities unless there was substantial improvement in procurement.
Upon their return from Jakarta, the authorities in each residency ordered the pangreh praja to do al1 in their power to achieve the rice delivery quota by the end of the fiscal year. Consequently a total of 1,490,546 tonnes of rice in stalk paddy was sold to the government by the end of March 1944, which meant that farmers were pressed to sell about 234,000 tonnes of rice in the off-crop season.
The Japanese authorities set the rice procurement target for the 1944 fiscal year at 2,086,400 tonnes, a 4.6% increase on the previous year. They als0 continued the intensified rice delivery campaigns. Despite their efforts, the quantity the government could purchase by the end of March 1945 was no more than 1,341,096 tonnes, due to a further deterioration of the transportation and milling facilities, the severe drought in mid-1944, a widening gap between the official and black market prices of rice, and avoidance of delivery by the farmers, bureaucrats, and rice dealers.
By this time the Japanese authorities had finally realized the difficulties of purchasing rice and thus lowered the target for the 1945 fiscal year to 1,732,000 tonnes. They attempted to secure 30% of this during the main . harvesting season, before the end of May, but could only obtain less than 20%. From June the rainfall again lessened sharply and there were signs of another drought. It was abundantly plain to the Japanese that even this conservative target could not be reached within the 1945 fiscal year. Thus the attempt to control rice distribution in Java, both in the first and the second phases, failed.
The pangreh praja and the peasant riots in Indramayu: One view
This abortive attempt had a serious impact on Javanese society. As a result, a series of peasant riots broke out during the main harvesting season of 1944 in Indramayu, one of the four regencies in Cirebon Residency. The riots started in April in the village of Kaplongan on the eastern border of the regency and spread to its western border within a few months. The Japanese quelled the riots by late July and dispatched some Indonesian inspectors, including Prawoto Soemodilogo, who was Sanyo (Indonesian adviser to the occupation government) to the Department of Industry. After the inspection trip Prawoto submitted a report consisting of four parts: part one, two versions of part two, and part three. The entire report was ostensibly written by the Sanyo to the Department of Industry, but it is unlikely that Prawoto wrote al1 the documents, because the views expressed in part one and those in the remaining parts sharply contradict each other in many respects.
Part one does seem to have been written by Prawoto himself. He was a graduate of OSVIA (Training School for Native Officials), had been at one stage vice-regent of Indramayu, and was an executive of the Pangreh Praja Federation and a member of the Volksraad (the representative body) before the war. He was, in al1 likelihood, a broad-minded intellectual with a deep concern for the welfare of the people. He was also a supporter of the Soetardjo petition of 1936, which called for the formation of a DutchIndonesian union within ten years, during which time self-govemment for Indonesia should be attained. The rejection of this petition by Royal Decree in 1938 disappointed him bitterly (Friend 198852) . His train of thought can be gathered from a number of recorded speeches and discussions during the occupation in which he consistently expressed progressive, reformist views.'OAlthough he was trained to be a pangreh praja, he was consistently and explicitly critica1 of the pangreh praja tendency to corruption and indifference to the sufferings of the people.
The views expressed in part one of the report are consistent with Prawoto's views expressed elsewhere. The author of part one argues that the cause of the riots was not the government's policies, nor could the blame be laid at any door other than the arbitrary and oppressive administration pursued by the pangreh praja in Indramayu. The report states:
'The people regard the cause of these unusual events as no more and no less than the arbitrary rule by the pangreh praja, particularly the Regent of Indramayu. The former Regent of Indramayu became the target of the people's hatred because he was a man of overweening arrogance. He did not like to associate with other officials, and did not deign to lower himself to mix with the common people in order to become familiar with their grievances and complaints. He was very short-tempered and irascible (drifiig) towards both other govemment officials and the people, disregarding the virtue of politeness, and therefore the people retaliated by abusing the person whom they considered to be in the wrong.'" Part one als0 reports that the Regent of Indramayu had arbitrarily increased the quota of rice deliveries to around 15 quintals per hectare of rice field (approximately 70% of the average production level), while in the other regencies in the Same residency the quotas were 3.5 to 4 quintals per hectare. The people in Indramayu had petitioned for the quota to be made the equivalent of those in the other regencies, but the pangreh praja under the Regent had responded to this request rudely and brusquely. The author ascribes the reason for the increase in the quota to the collusion between the pangreh praja and the Chinese rice dealers: 'the pangreh praja helped the Chinese rice dealers and millers because they knew that the Chinese could bribe them, and thus they set the quota for paddy deliveries extremely highY.l2 Prawoto also shows deep-felt compassion for those poor farmers who were victimized by the pangreh praja:
'Last year, when the government bought paddy in a similar manner, many children and adults stawed to death because there was little food left in the villages. The villagers had to feed their children with things like banana leaves and leaves of other trees which are unsuitable as food for animals, let alone people. This was simply to fill their stomachs. Very often the parents had to go without food for two to three days. They were unable to seek employment because, afflicted by undernourishment, they had no energy to work. The upshot was that numbers of people, particularly children, died. At the gathering in Kapalongan, the people therefore decided to oppose the govemment collection of paddy. If they were shot dead by the police, their fate would still be better than if they died of hunger, in which the suffering grows increasingly unbearable as the days pass. Moreover, if they were shot dead, they would not have to witness the sufferings of their children or their parents as they died of starvation. Because neither the pangreh praja, the government, nor anyone else heeded their requests, the villagers' anger reached its climax and exploded, and they were overcome with fury.'13
The author continues with a description of other corrupt tactics of the pangreh praja, concluding that 'al1 of the unrest and riots came from the poor people, not from the well-off'. Clearly the writer's primary concern is the welfare of the poor villagers, whom he believed to be the victims of the oppressive pangreh praja.
The pangreh praja and the peasant riots in Indramayu: Another view
The remaining parts of the report were written from a sharply different point of view. The main concern of the writer was to defend and promote the position of the pangreh praja. Knowing that Prawoto was critica1 of the pangreh praja, this writer apparently faked a report to defend them.
H e argues that the duty of the pangreh praja was to implement the government policies unswewingly:
'As long as the needs of the people and the needs of the govemment coincide, govemment politics at the regency level wil1 present no problem. But if the govemment's needs and the people's needs conflict, the Regent must execute the government's orders without question (ambtelijke discipline).
If the govemment needs to take al1 the paddy of the people of Indramayu for strategic purposes, then the Regent of Indramayu must execute the government's order, even if the pangreh praja are the father and the mother of the people. When he executes the government's order, it is not his place to question whether it is good or bad. This is the discipline that must be upheld by al1 government ofJicials, particularly the pangreh praja and the police. ' 14 From here he even goes so far as to argue that, if implementation of government policies caused a disturbance, the higher authorities, namely, the Japanese policy makers, should also be held responsible:
'Questions are being raised among thepangreh praja officials as to who must take responsibility for the blunder in Indramayu. Is it true that the Regent of Indramayu and the lower pangreh praja officials are solely responsible for it? Is it true that, if the leadership lies with the higher authorities, the Bucho [Japanese word for 'department head'] is to take sole responsibility and to be transferred, while those at the higher levels are exempt from responsibility? 'Vrawoto Report. 14 Prawoto Report. Italics in original.
The pangreh praja officials are of the opinion that the highest local govemment should also share responsibility for the blunder. How good it would be if, for the time being, an Indonesian selected from among the pangreh praja officials with broad experience, knowledge, and a firn stance, as wel1 as the ability to mix with the people and so forth, were to be appointed Resident of Cirebon.'l"
The writer laments that the pangreh praja in Indramayu were assaulted by the villagers simply because they tried faithfully and loyally to implement the policies formulated by the occupation government, and that after the riots broke out the Japanese dismissed or demoted them, thrusting the responsibility for the disturbance onto them. In the writer's view this was doing the pangreh praja a gross injustice:
'In this kind of situation the pangreh praja officials feel hemmed in. Their life is threatened by the people when they execute govemment orders to which the people take exception, and they are neither protected nor appreciated by the government that issues the orders. On the contrary, they have been sacrificed to please the people who rebelled. Is it therefore surprising that the pangreh praja feel that they lack the energy to cany out their duties?'l6
The main message in the faked parts of the document is that the pangreh praja were the representatives of the occupation government and therefore should be respected and protected as such by the occupation government.
Who, in fact, was responsible?
The most commonly presented analyses of the forced rice deliveries in Java and their impact on society are: first, the Japanese demanded rice for their own consumption; second, the Japanese banned interresidency rice trade for military reasons; and third, the pangreh praja often increased the delivery quotas set by the higher authorities. A careful investigation wil1 reveal that none of these was the intrinsic reason for the riots in Indramayu. The basic cause was the overall maladministration by the Japanese.
A drastic increase in the pressure on farmers in Indramayu, as elsewhere in Java, began in November 1943. On 15 November the Resident of Cirebon, Ichibangase, issued a decree in which he ordered farmers to sell al1 their stocks of rice to the government, with the exception of the portion needed for seed and domestic consumption. signs of famine in various places in Indramayu Regency.18 Unperturbed, Fujimura was more concerned about the procurement target than about the welfare of the people under his jurisdiction. Aware that the previous year's delivery had been unsatisfactory, Fujimura gave the warning of the Regent of Indramayu short shrift, choosing instead to emphasize that the delivery quota must be achieved.
The reason for the exceptionally high delivery quota for Indramayu was simple: it was an exceptional regency. The Cirebon Residency consisted of four regencies: Cirebon, Indramayu, Majalengka, and Kuningan. Although the Cirebon Residency as a whole was a rice surplus residency, Majalengka and Kuningan were mountainous and had to import rice from other areas. The Cirebon Regency was also a deficit area, except for the northern part bordering on Indramayu. Indramayu was, in contrast, one of the major rice-producing areas in Java, comparable to Besuki and Karawang. The rice mills were moreover concentrated in this regency. The system of land tenure in Indramayu was also unique. Whereas in the other three regencies communal tenure predominated, in Indramayu al1 the agricultural land was privately owned. Consequently there was a high concentration of land ownership, and much of the land was owned by absentee landlords. These landlords generally sold the entire crop to dealers, and the paddy was usually machine milled. It is therefore not surprising that the delivery quota for Indramayu was exceptionally high.
Why then did the farmers in Indramayu riot? One reason was clearly that the official price for rice was lower than the black market prices. Kurasawa Aiko's research has shown that the first riot started in the village of Kaplongan when the subdistrict head came and ordered the villagers to carry off the paddy of a wealthy villager who owned some twenty hectares of rice fields (Kurasawa 1983:60-2). There were many poor farmers who were economically dependent on the rich farmers, so they also joined the riots, but essentially the riots assumed the character of a struggle between government representatives who tried to enforce the delivery system and wealthy farmers who resisted.
By 28 July, when the riots had subsided, the amount of rice the government could buy from Indramayu was 30% of the original delivery quota, and in the whole of Cirebon Residency, 52% of the original quota, or 12% of the production level in 1940. The quantity actually delivered to the government was therefore only a smal1 fraction of the quantity marketed through non-government channels. Nevertheless, the Japanese interference which began in November 1943 resulted in a famine, and many stawed to death in the middle of this major rice-producing area. Why did this happen?
The main reason was that the Japanese policy disturbed the pattern of rice distribution in the countryside. If the official prices and the black market prices of rice had been the Same, the Japanese policy would not have made much difference to farmers. The Foodstuffs Management Office made a slight increase in the official purchase price of rice every year and that for 1944 was approximately 20% higher than the pre-war level. As we have seen, the non-official purchase price dropped below the official one in 1942, but by early 1944 had risen substantially higher in many parts of Java. When the administrative authorities in Indramayu announced that the farmers must sell large portions of their paddy to the government, many farmers, large and small, tried to smuggle their crop out of the regency as quickly as possible, before the government representatives arrived. Outside the regency there were still free markets and the rice fetched higher prices. The more the pangreh praja increased the pressure, the more the farmers and rice dealers smuggled or hoarded their rice. Consequently rice became very scarce in village markets in Indramayu and prices rose to the Same level as in the cities.19 This situation directly endangered the survival of the village poor who were dependent on the local market for their daily food requirements.
Ichibangase's order in November 1943, demanding that farmers surrender al1 their paddy except the portion for seed and domestic consumption, might seem harmless, but it was based on his ignorance of the local economy. Throughout Java, including major rice-producing villages, there were people who owned few or no rice fields. In areas where land ownership was concentrated among the wealthy few, the landless often constituted the majority of the village population. These people worked for well-to-do farmers as wage labourers or engaged in petty trade or cottage industry. They had to buy most of their daily food requirements from the local market with their meagre earnings. The surveys conducted in ricegrowing villages in Java in 1943 showed that even before the Japanese rice policy disturbed the local economy, landless peasants and smallholders could afford only one meal a day after spending most of their income on food (Sato 1994:83-114) . Market disturbances, such as price inflation, dislodged many villagers from this precarious economic balance.
Another cause of the famine was the problem of timing the obligatory rice delivery. In Indramayu, as elsewhere in Java, the main harvest took place in and around May, while milling continued for a while thereafter because drying, transporting, storing, and milling al1 took some time. The Japanese set monthly procurement quotas based on the pre-war record. 'When al1 is said and done, the rice bought by the govemrnent is used by the govemrnent to win the hearts of the people, but before this can be done, the nce delivery to the govemment makes the majority of the people fee1 heavy at heart. It is difficult to make the farmers understand our intentions and wishes. No matter how many times you rnay explain them, they wil1 not understand. In this case the best and the only way is to tel1 them that it is their duty to deliver the prescribed amounts of paddy to the govemment.'22
The pangreh praja were ordered to implement the policies, but they were often not informed of their purposes. Left in ignorante, they therefore either became remiss in their work or else discharged it unquestioningly, in an unreasonably autocratic manner.
The pangreh praja relationship with the villagers
The relationship between the pangreh praja and the villagers had never been amicable, but the Japanese occupation exacerbated it. Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to argue that most pangreh praja were autocratic and completely ignored the welfare of the people. Some pangreh praja evidently helped the villagers evade the government's levies and encouraged them to lay in as much food as possible for the off-crop season (Gunseiki Jawa Sangyo Soran 1944, I:3; Iwatake 1981:510). Even in cases where the pangreh praja were in direct conflict with the villagers, it falls far short of the mark to say that they intentionally oppressed the villagers. Ordering large farmers to sell their crop to the government is, for instance, not the Same as oppressing villagers. The Japanese policies often affected the village poor in very indirect and unforeseen ways, and therefore the pangreh praja, as the policy implementers, cannot be held totally responsible for the consequences.
It is nonetheless undeniable that the relationship between the pangreh praja and the villagers in many cases deteriorated conspicuously because of the Japanese demands on the villagers and the lack of communication between the ruler and the ruled. If the pangreh praja were poorly informed of the Japanese intentions, the villagers were even more so. Referring to the situation in late 1943 and early 1944, Charles van der Plas reported: 'the natives are convinced that the Japanese are shipping large quantities of rice from Java for military purposes; they think (evidently erroneously) to Tokyo'.23In the villagers' view, the Japanese intention was to squeeze them as much as possible, using the pangreh praja as agents.
The writer of the faked report is highly defensive of the position of the pangreh praja. Ironically enough, he amply substantiates Prawoto's criticism that the pangreh praja were arrogant and harsh, and were not particularly concerned about the welfare of the villagers. As the previous quotations have demonstrated, some pangreh praja did try to implement deleterious policies unquestioningly and ruthlessly. Their attitude towards the villagers was expressed straightforwardly in his criticism of the new Regent of Indramayu, appointed after the riots. The new Regent was a medica1 doctor called Moerjani, who was involved in the pergerakan, or the non-cooperative nationalist movement of the Dutch period. Moerjani's style of administration was different from that of traditional pangreh praja. He addressed himself to the villagers using the egalitarian term saudara (comrades) and made himself more approachable for the people. The writer of the faked document states:
'It is inappropriate for the Regent of Indramayu to address himself to the people using the term "saudara" because the use of this term is generally considered to debase the position of a Representative of the Government (Oriental Feelings). The leaders of the people from the pergerakan are indeed the same as those who gathered at the meetings.
This was as it should be, because those who made speeches and those who listened were at the Same level in the meeting. The [traditional] Regent's relationship to the people is different. The Regent is the father and the mother of the people and the Representative of the Government. This means that the Regent rules the people as the representative of the State. Herein lies the difference between the people's leaders from pergerakan circles and the people's leaders from the Government (pangreh praja).'24 Adopting this highly authoritarian point of view, the writer compares the relationship between the pangreh praja and the villagers to that between a father and his child: 'The pangreh praja carried out the order to purchase paddy, people rebelled and their demand was granted, the purchase was called off, many government officials were transferred, and the subdistrict heads dismissed. This situation is certainly wrong [...l. This is like the case of a child who wants something from his parents and is denied it, but when he cries gets it. This child wil1 use the stratagem of crying repeatedly. Inevitably his requests will become increasingly exorbitant and one day his father will be forced to refuse a request, taking strong measures if necessary. The best policy is for the father to reject the first demand of the tearful child because at that stage the child's discontent is not deeply rooted in its heart.'2' taken to Australia. 24 Prawoto Report. Italics in original. 25 Prawoto Report. about mass mobilization policies and had to make concrete proposals in their capacity as members of the centra1 and local advisory councils, as well as Sanyo. Although they worked with the Japanese, their main concern, as well as expertise, was with the future political status of Indonesia rather than the current local administration. The stenographic record of their discussions concerning rice procurement by the government reveals that communication between them and the Japanese authorities was poor. They were well aware that the policy was causing very serious problems in the villages and that some measures must be taken to alleviate the situation. But they did not have a clear understanding of the cause. Therefore, al1 they proposed was to strengthen governmental control of the rice distribution. It is clear, in hindsight, that their proposals, which were based on lack of expertise and experience in local administration, were impracticable and if implemented would have aggravated the situation.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to examine the position and role of the pangreh praja in Japanese-occupied Java. It has moreover tried to analyse their relationships with other major groupings, such as the Japanese, the nationalists, and the peasants, from the pangreh praja point of view using documents produced by the pangreh praja themselves.
Our understanding of the issue is essentially limited due to our lack of understanding of the other groups, particularly the Japanese and the peasantry. With regard to the Japanese, only the broad outlines of their policies have been studied and many aspects remain hazy. The peasantry has been studied mainly in relation to the Japanese policy of forced delivery of rice to the government. Another aspect that is vitally important is the issue of labour. In the second half of the occupation, the Japanese constantly employed a few million people within Java under the banner of the 'New Java'. We must investigate what exactly this 'New Java' was and for what purposes the Japanese employed the mobilized labourers.
One of the major projects which absorbed much of the forced labour was the campaign to increase the production of food, particularly rice. The Japanese employed much labour for improving the agricultural infrastructure, such as irrigation channels, but food production declined rapidly during the occupation. In order to assess the impact of this campaign on the peasantry and the pangreh praja, more case studies must be carried o~t.31
From the present study, we would be able to draw the following tentative conclusion. The widely held view that the pangreh praja oppressed the villagers as the agents of an exploitative government seems Research int0 this issue by the present writer is currently in progress. The results wil1 be published soon.
